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An integrative review of attention
biases and their contribution to
treatment for anxiety disorders
Tom J. Barry*, Bram Vervliet and Dirk Hermans
Centre for the Psychology of Learning and Experimental Psychopathology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences,
University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Models of exposure therapy, one of the key components of cognitive behavioral therapy
for anxiety disorders, suggest that attention may play an important role in the extinction
of fear and anxiety. Evidence from cognitive research suggests that individual differences
may play a causal role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders and so
it is also likely to influence treatment. We review the evidence concerning attention
and treatment outcomes in anxiety disorders. The evidence reviewed here suggests
that that attention biases assessed at pre-treatment might actually predict improved
response to treatment, and in particular that prolonged engagement with threat as
measured in tasks such as the dot probe is associated with greater reductions in
anxious symptoms following treatment. We examine this research within a fear learning
framework, considering the possible role of individual differences in attention in the
extinction of fear during exposure. Theoretical, experimental and clinical implications
are discussed, particularly with reference to the potential for attention bias modification
programs in augmenting treatment, and also with reference to how existing research in
this area might inform best practice for clinicians.
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Introduction
The clinical utility of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and in particular exposure therapy, has
long been established, especially in terms of its eﬀects on relieving the symptoms associated with
anxiety disorders (Hofmann, 2008). Nevertheless, for some clinically anxious people, exposure
is insuﬃcient at alleviating their symptoms or, where there is symptom improvement, they may
relapse over time (Craske and Mystkowski, 2006). There has been little research into why there are
diﬀerences between individuals in their responses to treatment although it is perhaps not surprising
that such diﬀerences exist given the diversity that exists in the biological, psychological, and social
pathways to the onset and maintenance of anxiety. Interest is developing in the area of stratiﬁed
medicine and tailoring treatment to individual proﬁles, rather than assuming that treatment is one-
size-ﬁts-all (Lester and Eley, 2013). There is a need, therefore, to better understand the mechanisms
that underlie anxiety disorders and how these might inﬂuence treatment.
Disorders such as speciﬁc phobia, social anxiety disorder (SAD), panic disorder (PD),
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are characterized
by excessively intense, frequent and enduring fear or anxiety concerning the possible occurrence
of something terrible. Fear is often an adaptive response to threat, wherein there is a rapid,
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involuntary, physiological reaction that facilitates the selection
and production of an appropriate behavioral or cognitive
response (Ekman, 1992). Anxiety is the prospective connection
between this fear response and events in the future (Hofmann
et al., 2012). Anxious people display hypersensitivity in
recognizing, processing and responding to threat-related
information even in the absence of actual threat. Where a
non-anxious person might rapidly recognize an actual source
of threat in their environment, such as an approaching snake,
someone with speciﬁc phobia for snakes might also display fear
and the accompanying neurocognitive response to a shoelace
on their kitchen ﬂoor. The onset and maintenance of anxiety
disorders has been associated with biases in attention, and in
particular, a tendency to be easily distracted by potential threats
and to maintain attentional focus on these threats at the expense
of attending to other, perhaps more important, things in the
environment (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Cognitive-behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders therefore
seeks to reduce fear and anxiety as well as the neurocognitive
mechanisms that underlie them (Hofmann, 2008). However,
if mechanisms such as attention biases inﬂuence the way in
which people process and interact with the objects of their
fears then we might ask whether they can also inﬂuence
treatments that rely on interaction with these feared stimuli; and,
whether individual diﬀerences in attention predict diﬀerential
responses to treatment. The current review seeks to understand
how individual diﬀerences in attention might inﬂuence
treatment.
First we will explain our conceptualisation of attentional
biases, whilst also addressing the literature concerning individual
diﬀerences in attentional biases within anxiety disorders. Second,
we will consider the role of attention in the learning that underlies
exposure therapy. Then, we will conduct a critical examination
of the literature concerning the moderating inﬂuence of
attentional biases, and any related neurophysiological correlates,
on treatment outcomes for anxiety disorders. The results of these
studies will be considered within the context of models of the
underlying mechanisms involved in exposure (e.g., extinction
learning). Finally, the theoretical, experimental, and clinical
implications of this examination will be presented. The research
in this area remains in its infancy, thus precluding a meta-
analysis of the data available, but we hope that by collating and
reviewing the present evidence and providing the most up-to-
date theoretical perspective, that wemight provide inspiration for
clinical and research developments.
Background
Attentional Biases
Limitations in the capacities of both the visual system and
working memory mean that not all information from the
environment and from long-term memory can be selected for
more detailed processing. Instead, some information is given
priority and is selected, and unwanted information is ﬁltered
out. From this, appropriate responses to environmental stressors
can be produced. Prioritization and selection can be through
top–down, voluntary, goal direction or bottom–up, automatic,
attentional capture (Weierich et al., 2008). Stimulus processing
and attentional selection can also be overt (e.g., through eye
movements) or covert (e.g., the orientation of internal attention).
For example, a person conducting a top–down overt visual
search for a particular ﬂower might covertly ﬁlter out the
various trees and bushes in a woodland scene. As part of this
covert ﬁltering, visual sensitivity might increase for objects more
alike one’s expectations of the sought after ﬂower. This would
reduce the number of stimuli to be processed during the overt
movement of the eyes during the visual search. However, a
visually salient, large, red tree in this scene may capture attention
in a bottom–up way, irrespective of the viewer’s goals. For
anxious people attentional selection appears to be weighted
in favor of bottom–up processing – particularly when there
is a potentially threatening stimulus in the environment –
relative to non-anxious people who can evoke greater top–
down attention control (Eysenck et al., 2007). The eﬀect of this
is that anxious people have a tendency for their attention to
be captured by threat-relevant stimuli over and above other
stimuli, even when their attention should be focused elsewhere
(McGinnis Deweese et al., 2014). Attentional selection and
control is then facilitated by three executive processes: shifting
between stimuli, thoughts or responses; updating attentional
selection based on changes in goals; and inhibiting attentional
engagement with irrelevant stimuli or thoughts (Eysenck et al.,
2007).
Research suggests that prior to the onset of and during
anxiety disorders, attention can be biased such that there
are deﬁcits in inhibiting distraction by emotional stimuli,
enhanced shifting of attention toward or away from these
stimuli or deﬁcits in shifting away from threat stimuli once
engaged, as well as deﬁcits in updating attention based on
new information, perhaps pertaining to safety. Biases in
attention can therefore be categorized into three components
subsumed within two directions (toward or away from
threat): engagement with threat, disengagement with threat,
and an attentional avoidance of threat (Cisler and Koster,
2010).
Engagement with Threat
Anxiety has been associated with facilitated engagement with
threat. This means that salient, potentially threatening stimuli
can capture the attention of anxious people more readily than
non-anxious people, the result of which is that they show rapid
movement of their attention toward these stimuli (Eysenck et al.,
2007). This is perhaps due to increased utilization of the rapid,
subcortical, amygdala-driven “low road” in the processing of
emotional stimuli, rather than through use of the higher cortical
pathway (LeDoux, 1996). For example, when someone rapidly
orientates toward a shoelace on their kitchen ﬂoor that they
thought was a snake. In this case there is bottom–up attentional
capture due to peripheral recognition of the perceptual features
of the lace (e.g., its length, color, and shape) and their similarity
with the appearance of a snake. This leads to rapid re-orientation
of eye-gaze and attentional engagement with this perceived
threat.
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This bias has been examined in a number of experimental
settings. In visual search paradigms anxious people typically
show quicker detection of disorder-relevant and threatening
targets hidden amongst neutral distractors relative to non-
threat targets (Lipp and Waters, 2007; Soares et al., 2009)
and relative to the performance of non-anxious people (Rinck
et al., 2005). Gaze-tracking research has shown that, relative to
non-anxious people, anxious people are more likely to orient
their gaze toward threat stimuli before they orient toward
neutral stimuli when the two are presented simultaneously
(e.g., Calvo and Avero, 2005; Felmingham et al., 2011).
There is also some evidence that anxious people orient their
gaze toward emotional faces, irrespective of their valence,
quicker than do non-anxious people (Holas et al., 2014). In
Dot Probe tasks where participants are shown threat and
neutral stimulus pairings followed by a geometrical target to
which they are to respond, anxious participants have also
shown speeded recognition of the target when it follows a
threat stimulus, relative to if it follows a neutral stimulus
and relative to non-anxious participants (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007).
Disengagement with Threat
The second attentional bias component concerns disengagement
with threat. Research has consistently demonstrated that anxious
people show slowed response times or a deﬁcit in disengaging
attention from threat-related stimuli, relative to non-anxious
people. Anxious participants perform more slowly than controls
in visual search experiments where participants must locate
neutral targets that are hidden amongst threatening distractors
(Gerdes et al., 2008). Anxious people also perform more slowly
than controls in Dot Probe trials when the target follows the
neutral stimulus rather than the threat stimulus (e.g., Koster
et al., 2006) and in spatial cuing trials when a target appears
on the opposite side of a computer screen from a preceding
threat stimulus (e.g., Cisler and Olatunji, 2010). Persistent
engagement with a threat stimulus can be at the expense of
attending to other neutral, positive or safety signaling stimuli
presented simultaneously, or other stimuli in the environment
that require attention. This has been conﬁrmed with eye-tracking
measures in both visual search and free-viewing paradigms
(e.g., Gerdes et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010) where
anxious people have been shown to ﬁxate longer on threat
stimuli relative to non-threat stimuli. There has also been
some suggestion that in the Stroop task, slowed naming of the
color that threat words are presented in is also evidence of
diﬃculties in disengaging attention from threat, however, this
has been widely disputed (Williams et al., 1996; Weierich et al.,
2008).
The eﬀect of maintained attention toward a threat stimulus
is that the person may continue to think or ruminate about the
possibility of an approaching threat (Fox et al., 2001) and their
attention may then narrow, preventing them from attending to
other less salient peripheral cues in their environment (Eysenck
et al., 2007). As such they may remain in an anxious state for
longer, and they may be prevented from shifting their attention
to information that violates their expectancy of an aversive event.
For example, in dog phobia, attending to the teeth of a barking
dog might prevent one from acknowledging that the dog is
attached to a leash and cannot reach them.
Attentional Avoidance of Threat
The third component of attentional biases involves avoidance
of threat, where the person covertly ﬁlters out threat-relevant
stimuli or thoughts from attentional selection and overtly
avoids attending toward them, should they appear (Hofmann
et al., 2012). When an avoidant response is initiated, the
scope of attention becomes narrowed which in turn limits
the likelihood that peripheral threat stimuli will be recognized
(Förster et al., 2006). As such, avoidance prevents the anxious
person from encountering and processing information thatmight
violate their expectancy of something aversive happening. To
return to the example of the shoelace on the kitchen ﬂoor,
some anxious individuals, after initially covertly or overtly
recognizing the shoelace or snake in their periphery may
look away immediately. This prevents them from learning to
discriminate snakes from other perceptually similar stimuli, so
their generalized fear persists; and if there was a snake, they would
never learn that snakes are perhaps not as dangerous as they
believe.
Eye-tracking research has shown that if a threat stimulus is
presented for a long period of time, anxious people tend to
avoid looking at it (Calvo and Avero, 2005). Avoidance is also
common when threat images are also associated with feelings
of disgust as with pictures of needles in Bloody-Injection-Injury
phobia (Armstrong et al., 2013). Implicit within avoidance is
that threat is ﬁrst recognized – although not necessarily overtly
or consciously (Ellenbogen and Schwartzman, 2009) – and then
later avoided due to top–down redirection (Armstrong and
Olatunji, 2012). This has also been demonstrated in conditioning
research where, at shorter latencies, participants show orientation
toward stimuli that are aversively conditioned (CS+) relative to
neutral stimuli (CS−). At longer latencies, however, participants
tend to look more toward neutral CS− than toward CS+
(Mulckhuyse et al., 2013).
It is worth stressing that the components of attentional
biases should not be considered in isolation or as mutually
exclusive from one another (Weierich et al., 2008). Eye-tracking
research suggests it is possible to exhibit facilitated engagement
with threat immediately after a threat is presented as well
as avoidance at later stages of presentation (Armstrong and
Olatunji, 2012). It is also possible to distinguish between anxious
individuals who have a general tendency to attend toward
threat from others who avoid threat (Koster et al., 2006). There
may also be people who possess neither of these tendencies
but who ﬁnd it diﬃcult to disengage from threat once it is
engaged (Fox et al., 2002). Attentional biases are also not
necessary components of anxiety disorders; there are some
anxious people who may not exhibit any bias (Berggren and
Derakshan, 2013). They are also not speciﬁc to anxiety as they
may also be present, although qualitatively diﬀerent, in depressed
individuals (Peckham et al., 2010) and persons with eating
disorders (Shafran et al., 2007) when disorder-relevant stimuli are
presented.
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There is overwhelming evidence concerning the presence of
attentional biases in anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Armstrong and Olatunji, 2012). If attention is seen to play a role
in any element of the process of change in treatment, we might
expect treatment outcomes to be inﬂuenced by these attentional
biases. More speciﬁcally, given the heterogeneity in attentional
biases between anxious people – toward or away from threat;
facilitated engagement or deﬁcits in disengagement; any bias or
no bias – that the presence of individual diﬀerences in attentional
biases might produce diﬀerential outcomes. A wealth of research
exists suggesting that attention can play a crucial role in the
learning that is thought to take place during exposure therapy,
a principle behavioral component of CBT for anxiety disorders.
We will now ask, how does exposure therapy treat anxiety, and
what is the role of attention in this process.
Attention and Exposure Therapy
Exposure therapy is the most eﬃcacious treatment for anxiety
disorders (Craske et al., 2008), whether it is administered alone
or as one part of a larger CBT program. The learning that
occurs during exposure therapy and the reduction in fear and
anxiety that is observed is often explained using Pavlovian
models of fear conditioning and extinction. In these models,
fear develops due to an association between aﬀectively neutral,
conditional, stimuli (CS), such as animals, objects, situations
and physiological sensations, and aversive, unconditional, stimuli
(US), such as anything that might cause physical or psychological
harm (e.g., a dog bite, negative judgment, a panic attack). Fear is
then expressed when CSs are encountered, the CS–US association
is retrieved from memory and subsequent anticipation of the
US occurs. Exposure therapy involves repeated exposure to these
feared CSs in the absence of the expected aversive US. Exposure
is thought to be successful when a person can approach a
previously feared stimulus without the concomitant experience
of fear.
There are two predominant approaches to explaining the
eﬀects of exposure therapy and the mechanism by which fear and
anxiety reduce. In habituation or emotional processing models,
CS, their aversive meanings and the accompanying emotions,
cognitions and behaviors are held as structures within memory.
The fear evoked by a CS reduces during exposure therapy due to
activation and correction of the fear structure as it is updated with
new information about the aﬀectively neutral nature of the CS
(Foa and Kozak, 1986). This model was later modiﬁed to include
an inhibitory safety structure in order to accommodate research
suggesting that fear memories may only be inhibited rather than
updated (Foa et al., 2006). Nevertheless, in order to elicit the most
fear habituation – and reduce the chances of a return of fear
after exposure – the fear structure must be maximally activated
during exposure. The presentation of a feared object does not
guarantee that functional exposure (awareness and processing of
feared stimuli) or extinction of fear will take place (Borkovec
and Grayson, 1980). Fully activating the fear structure requires
that clients focus their attention entirely on the subject of their
exposure and are not given any opportunities for avoidance
or distraction and this then facilitates habituation of the fear
response.
The alternative approach comes from inhibitory learning
models of fear extinction, which suggest that when CSs are
encountered in the absence of the US, a newCS–noUS association
is formed and this inhibits the original fear eliciting excitatory
CS–US association. The original CS–US association remains
intact. Under certain conditions it might be retrieved and fear
may return and clinical relapse might occur (Craske et al., 2008).
In order to fully inhibit the original CS–US fear association, there
must be maximal violation of US expectancy. This means that the
client learns that the object of their fear is no longer predictive
of an aversive consequence. Within this approach, habituation of
the fear response is not necessarily indicative of the extent of this
new learning. It is essential that this new inhibitory learning is
not conditional upon some other element of the exposure. Clients
should not attend to any element of the exposure stimulus or its
surrounding context that might explain the non-occurrence of
the US. For example, whilst being treated for snake phobia, the
client must focus on the snake they are being exposed to so that
they can learn that snakes are not always dangerous. The client
should not, however, distract themselves by not thinking about
the snake or by attending to other elements of the clinic room in
which they are sat or any features of the snake (e.g., its small size)
that might explain why this snake is not dangerous.
Attention and Distraction
According to both models of exposure treatment presented here,
attending to anything other than the object of an exposure session
should lead to worse outcomes relative to engagement with a
perceived source of threat, although the models diﬀer in their
explanation of why this is the case and the extent to which this can
be a problem (e.g., the extent to which this leads to habituation of
fear). As such there is a body of research concerning the eﬀects
of manipulations of distraction on exposure eﬃcacy. Distraction
is typically deﬁned as insuﬃcient attention to the source of a
potential threat. It can involve overt redirection of attention
toward some threat-irrelevant task, stimulus or non-threatening
features of a feared stimulus; or covert redirection of attention
and attempts to not think about potential threats (Podinã et al.,
2013). There are clear similarities between this deﬁnition of
distraction and threat-avoidant attention biases.
Research concerning the eﬀects of distracted versus focused
attention on exposure outcomes might similarly shed light on the
possible eﬀects of attention biases on exposure outcomes. In fact,
one study found that participants who were distracted during
exposure showed similar fear reductions as participants who
were given “natural” exposure with no attention manipulation,
relative to a third condition where participants were instructed to
focus their attention (Craske et al., 1991). The authors reasoned
that anxious people are likely to attend away from and avoid
threat during normal or natural exposure without a speciﬁc
therapist-initiated attention manipulation and so they are likely
to show similar fear reduction as clients who are distracted
by the therapist. Research concerning the eﬀects of distracted
versus focused exposure has produced mixed ﬁndings. A recent
meta-analysis found that overall there was no diﬀerence between
distracted versus focused exposure in terms of treatment outcome
(Podinã et al., 2013). However, the results were in favor of
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distracted exposure – greater approach of and reduced distress
concerning previously feared stimuli following treatment –
relative to focused exposure when there were multiple exposure
sessions (Oliver and Page, 2008) and when distraction involved
client-therapist interaction concerning something irrelevant to
the exposure (e.g., Johnstone and Page, 2004). Parrish et al. (2008)
suggested that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of distraction may be due
to increases in self-eﬃcacy and the belief that threat and the
accompanying anxiety could be controlled, however, multiple
sessions may be required in order to see this beneﬁt.
Interpreting these data in line with attention biases, we might
expect that a tendency to attend away from threat would not
necessarily be associated with worse treatment outcome if such
avoidance during exposure were accompanied by a belief that
threat and/or the fear response can be managed. However, if
the immediate post-treatment beneﬁt of attending away from
threat is provided by improvements in self-eﬃcacy, rather than
enhanced inhibitory learning, there is a possibility that fear might
return later if people no longer feel as though they are competent
enough to manage threat (Craske et al., 2008). That is not to
say that attending toward threat would not be beneﬁcial for the
treatment of fear. Waters and Kershaw (2015) recently showed
that children with an attention bias toward threat, measured
using a Dot Probe task, showed enhanced extinction of fear to a
CS, relative to children with an avoidant attention bias. Asmodels
of extinction learning and exposure suggest, the reduction of
fear requires at least some engagement with the potential sources
of threat and subsequent learning about the non-occurrence of
anticipated danger.
Attention and Context Dependency
The inhibitory model of extinction and exposure was developed
following research concerning the fragility of extinction learning
and the factors that can lead to a return of fear after extinction.
One of the main ﬁndings concerned the context dependency of
extinction learning and the renewal eﬀect. During extinction and
exposure, when a feared stimulus is presented and the expected
aversive US does not occur, the anxious or fearful person seeks to
resolve the conﬂict between their expectation and reality (Bouton,
2004). One way in which this conﬂict can be resolved is by
attending to details of the context that might explain the non-
occurrence of the US. Someone who is snake phobic, for example,
might see the hospital room and the presence of clinicians as
an explanation for why the snake they are being exposed to is
not dangerous. Extinction learning then becomes conﬁned to the
context and if there is a change of context after extinction or
exposure, fear can return (Rowe and Craske, 1998).
Attending more or less toward the context during exposure
sessions should inﬂuence the extent of return of fear after
exposure. As such we would expect that if people attend away
from threat during exposure then they may be encoding more
contextual detail rather than focusing on the feared stimulus and
the non-occurrence of the US. This would make any extinction
learning that develops during exposure to be contextually speciﬁc
and more susceptible to renewal after treatment. We would
expect, therefore, that attention away from threat would be
predictive of worse outcomes relative to no bias and attention
toward threat, particularly in single session exposure trials when
there is little additional opportunity for threat engagement
and extinction learning. We would also expect that attention
toward threat, and in particular deﬁcits in disengaging from
threat, would outperform no bias at all given that there may
be attentional narrowing (Eysenck et al., 2007) and reduced
contextual encoding in people who attend more toward feared
stimuli during exposure sessions.
There has as yet been no direct examination of the eﬀects
of attention toward or away from a context on return of
fear, however, research using rats found that administration
of the drug scopolamine during extinction reduced contextual
encoding and return of fear following a context change after
extinction (Zelikowsky et al., 2013). Scopolamine, a drug that
blocks activity in acetylcholine receptors, is known to reduce
attentional capacity, narrow attentional focus and reduce top–
down attentional control (Dunne and Hartley, 1986; Klinkenberg
et al., 2011). Administration of scopolamine during extinction
might reduce peripheral attention and so too the contextual
speciﬁcity of extinction learning.
Attention and Stimulus Generalization
Attention might also inﬂuence extinction learning and exposure
in terms of stimulus processing and generalization. Besides
attending to details in the exposure context, anxious people might
also look to some element of the exposure stimulus itself in order
to explain why the US has not occurred (Vervliet et al., 2004).
In exposure therapy, there is a reliance on perceptually similar
stimuli or situations that share only some of the features of the
original CS. For example, if someone is bitten by a dog and
subsequently develops a dog phobia, then it is very likely that
the original dog will not be accessible at the time of treatment.
It can be possible to explain the non-occurrence of the US by
recognizing the features of the exposure stimulus that were not
present in the original CS. For example, if someone is bitten
by a black, long-haired, dog such that they develop a fear for
dogs, and then they are exposed to a blonde, long-haired dog
during treatment, the inhibitory association could be conﬁned
to the features in common between these two dogs (e.g., their
long hair) and their may be an enduring fear association between
the features unique to the original dog that were not present in
exposure (e.g., black hair). The more common exposure stimuli
are to originally feared or prototypical stimuli, the more robust
the extinction learning (Vervliet et al., 2005, 2006).
If someone attends more to the features in common between
the original CS and the exposure stimulus, which have previously
been associated with threat, then they may not recognize
or encode the dissimilarity between these two stimuli and
their extinction learning will be more generalizable. We would
hypothesize from this that an attention bias toward threat, and
in particular deﬁcits in disengagement, would be associated with
better outcomes relative to an attention bias away from threat or
no bias at all as these biases may inﬂuence attention to threat or
non-threat stimulus features. However, it might also be possible
to initially attend toward the threatening features of a stimulus
and to then overtly shift away from and avoid them whilst still
covertly engaging with the threat and continuing to think about
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it. In this case we might expect an attention bias away from threat
to outperform no bias at all. This would be similar to interactive
distraction conditions where an attention bias away from threat
and distraction could both provide an opportunity to manage
anxiety levels providing that there is still engagement with threat
stimuli or their threatening features.
Attention and the Non-Occurrence of the US
It is implicit within models of extinction learning that in exposure
people must not only attend to the stimuli or situations to which
they are being exposed, but also to the non-occurrence of the
aversive event, the US, that they anticipate will occur (Craske
et al., 2008). This can be an issue in the case of subtler USs
such as in SAD with negative social reactions that are very rarely
explicit. In such instances anxious people might attend more to
negative thoughts about their performance or their physiology
(e.g., concerning their heart rate or their blushing) rather than
on the non-occurrence of the imagined negative event. This kind
of self-focused attention is thought to underlie disorders such
as SAD (Clark and Wells, 1995; Spurr and Stopa, 2002) and
PD (Olatunji et al., 2007). Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that
self-focused attention prevents people from attending to external
information in their environment that might disconﬁrm their
beliefs about the occurrence of negative evaluation after social
encounters. We might expect that diﬃculty in disengaging from
threat might be related to maintaining attention internally. This
is relative to when someone shows a tendency for facilitated
engagement with threat or avoidance of threat where the ability
to shift attention is preserved. In these cases, we might expect a
shift in attention from internal cues to the non-occurrence of an
expected negative outcome.
Attention plays an important role in both the onset and
maintenance of anxiety disorders and also in the learning that
takes place during their treatment, irrespective of the model
one uses to explain the eﬀects of exposure therapy. We will
now examine the evidence concerning how attention to threat-
relevant stimuli diﬀers between individuals and what the eﬀects
of these diﬀerences are on the eﬃcacy of exposure therapy.
Attentional Biases and Treatment
Outcomes
Research in this area began indirectly with a number of studies
that explored the eﬀects of exposure (alone or as part of a
program of CBT) on attention biases. These studies measured
attention biases in terms of performance interference on a
color naming Stroop task when the words included in the
task were disorder-relevant (e.g., spider phobic participants
being shown spider, web or crawling). Lavy et al. (1993;
N = 36) showed evidence of a trend-level correlation between
pre-treatment Stroop interference (SI) scores and behavioral
avoidance following treatment (r = −0.25, p = 0.07). We
might tentatively interpret this ﬁnding as suggesting that greater
interference from disorder-relevant words on color-naming in
a Stroop task was associated with greater behavioral avoidance
following treatment. Put otherwise, a threat-related attention
bias was associated with worse treatment outcome. In another
study, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in pre-treatment SI
scores for social threat words between clients who responded to
treatment and those that did not (Mattia et al., 1993; N = 33).
Participants in this study were given either a pharmaceutical
intervention, pill placebo or 12-weeks of group CBT (including
sessions of cognitive restructuring, goal setting and exposure).
However, the authors did not test whether treatment response
was diﬀerentially related to SI scores for each of these treatment
modalities separately. This makes it impossible to conclude
as to the speciﬁc relationship between CBT or the exposure
component within and SI. van den Hout et al. (1997) also
reported no correlation between pre-treatment SI scores and
treatment gains in a sample of participants with speciﬁc phobia
(N = 37) who received a single session of exposure treatment.
Lundh and Öst (2001) showed that in a sample of social phobia
clients who received individual, group or self-administered CBT
(N = 24) that a greater proportion of treatment responders (78%)
showed SI at pre-test relative to non-responders (50%) who “did
not show any Stroop Interference before treatment,” although
this was not statistically tested. However, the authors did not
provide detail on the components of their CBT programs limiting
the conclusions that can be made concerning the relationship
between attention biases and exposure. In their investigation into
the eﬀects of diﬀerent psychological treatments on SI on motor-
vehicle accident related PTSD (N = 23), Devineni et al. (2004)
showed that pre-treatment SI did not signiﬁcantly predict the
presence or absence of PTSD immediately after treatment or at
3-months follow-up. However, they also report an improvement
in PTSD status irrespective of whether participants received CBT
or were on a wait-list control. It is meaningless therefore to
draw any distinction between treatment responders and non-
responders given that it is impossible to diﬀerentiate a treatment
responder from a control participant whose symptoms abated
over time. Also, more recently, researchers have questioned the
validity of using SI to measure attentional biases. Performance
on the Stroop does not require any overt orientating of attention
and it is not possible to determine whether the Stroop is instead
drawing upon a covert attentional system. SI may be more
indicative of a general threat-processing deﬁcit rather than a
deﬁcit in any speciﬁc attentional component (Weierich et al.,
2008). As such, the aforementioned studies are presented in
brief because of their signiﬁcant methodological limitations
and the problematic use of SI to infer attention biases (see
Discussion).
In light of these methodological problems, Legerstee et al.
(2009) were the ﬁrst researchers to directly investigate the
eﬀects of threat-related attentional biases on treatment outcomes.
Children (N = 131; age range 8–16 years) who presented with a
primary diagnosis of Separation Anxiety Disorder, GAD, SAD,
or Speciﬁc Phobia were randomized into group or individual
(although there was no test of whether either was better than
the other) CBT programs. The authors reported that response
latencies to a Dot Probe target that followed a severe threat
image in severe/neutral image pairings predicted 10–13% of
the variance in treatment outcome (p = 0.001), even when
controlling for pre-treatment anxiety severity. Contrary to their
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hypotheses, treatment responders were less likely to engage their
attention toward threat images than non-responders, who were
more likely to show diﬃculties in disengaging their attention
from threat. According to the authors, people who tend to inhibit
negative information and avoid processing threatening stimuli in
detail may respond better to CBT.
Legerstee et al. (2010) replicated this ﬁnding in a similar
study that separated participants in terms of whether they
responded to treatment and how long it took for them to
respond. Participants (N = 91) had a similar demographic and
diagnostic proﬁle to participants in their previous study. Initial
responders no longer met diagnostic criteria after 10 sessions
of CBT alone and four sessions with their parent; secondary
responders were those who continued to meet diagnostic criteria
after these initial sessions but who later responded following
10 subsequent sessions of combined child and parent sessions.
They found that initial responders showed slower responses
on congruent trials where the target followed the threat image
in threat/neutral image pairings, than on incongruent trials
where the target followed the neutral image. Put otherwise,
initial responders showed selective attention away from threat,
attending more toward neutral images than to threat images.
Secondary responders showed selective attention toward threat
with slower responses on incongruent trials than on congruent
trials. Treatment non-responders showed no evidence of an
attentional bias toward or away from threat before or after
treatment. Following treatment, initial and secondary responders
showed diﬃculties disengaging from threat. This conﬁrmed
Legerstee et al. (2009) earlier conclusion that exposure might
reinforce prolonged engagement with feared stimuli. Participants
with a bias in either direction responded better to treatment than
people with no bias at all.
Price et al. (2011) investigated whether the direction of
attentional selectivity, toward or away from threat, inﬂuenced
treatment outcome in a sample of adults with SAD (N = 24)
who underwent eight sessions of CBT including virtual reality
exposure. Attentional bias was assessed using a neutral/threat
(angry) face Dot Probe task. Mean response times in congruent
trials, when the target followed the threat image, were
subtracted from incongruent trials, where the target followed
the neutral image. Participants with a positive score on
this index were classiﬁed as being vigilant toward threat
whereas a negative score meant they were avoidant of threat.
Avoidant attention biases at pre-treatment were associated
with worse post-treatment symptom scores relative to vigilant
threat biases. A tendency to attend more toward threat was
associated with improved outcomes relative to attending away
from threat. The authors reasoned that avoidance of threat
was analogous to distraction and poor engagement with
exposure and worsened extinction learning. Further analysis
suggested that the eﬀect of an avoidant attention bias on
treatment outcome was independent of the severity of this
bias. However, for those with a vigilant threat bias, higher
scores were associated with worse response to treatment. These
ﬁndings suggest that even though generally attending toward
threat may be beneﬁcial, there is also variability within this
bias, such that being highly vigilant and perhaps not being
able to attend anywhere other than toward threat can be
detrimental.
The ﬁndings of Price et al. (2011) were replicated in a sample
of children with a principle diagnosis of GAD or SAD (N = 35)
that received a group CBT program (Waters et al., 2012). After
10 weeks of treatment, participants with an attention bias toward
threat, assessed using the angry-face Dot Probe task, showed
lower parent-rated symptom severity relative to children with
an attention bias away from threat. Children with an attention
bias toward threat were also less likely to meet diagnostic
criteria at post-treatment. Waters et al. (2012) added that the
relationship between attention biases and treatment response
appeared to be independent of the severity of pre-treatment
disorder severity.
Finally, Niles et al. (2013) gave participants (N = 22) a
12-session course of CBT or ACT for social phobia. They
used a Spatial Cuing task to measure attentional biases. In
their variant of the Spatial Cuing task, threatening (angry or
disapproving) faces or images of neutral household objects were
presented in the center of the screen and this was then followed
by a target letter above, below, or to the left or right. The
time participants took to identify the target letter was then
averaged across both threat categories. Participants who showed
slower reaction times identifying targets that were preceded by
a threatening face (interpreted as diﬃculty disengaging from
threat) also showed greater improvement in clinician-rated fear
and avoidance scores after treatment, relative to participants
who showed no response slowing. There was also a trend
toward the same relationship with self-report symptoms too.
Attention toward threat, and in particular diﬃculty disengaging
with threat, was associated with improved response to treatment
relative to if a client showed no threat-related attention
bias.
Attention-Like Traits and Treatment Outcome
People who selectively attend toward threat may also be those
who adopt a monitoring coping style in managing their anxiety
and who seek knowledge about sources of threat and make
greater attempts at processing threat stimuli (Mobini and Grant,
2007). Alternatively, people who selectively attend away from
threat – or who adopt a blunting coping style –may bemore likely
to inhibit threatening information and avoid fully engaging with
exposure stimuli or situations (Mobini and Grant, 2007). There
have been a number of studies concerned with exploring whether
monitoring or blunting coping styles, measured using self-report
questionnaires, were related to treatment outcomes (Steketee
et al., 1989; Muris et al., 1993a,b, 1995; Antony et al., 2001).
However, the ﬁndings in this area have been mixed. Steketee
et al. (1989) found that monitors, relative to blunters, had
greater habituation in heart rate, within and between exposure
sessions. However, Muris et al. (1993a,b, 1995) showed that
blunters, relative to monitors, improved most in self-report
symptom measures and behavioral approach following a one-
session exposure treatment. These studies do not include a
crucial control group of people who were neither monitors nor
blunters, but these data would suggest that monitoring and
blunting, or at least self-reporting as such, are both associated
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with improved treatment outcomes at least immediately post-
treatment.
The Neurophysiology of Attention and
Treatment Outcomes
Neurological Correlates of Treatment Response
A number of studies have explored the neural correlates of
exposure outcomes and in particular how areas of the brain
associated with attentional engagement might relate to treatment
outcome. Improved treatment outcome has been associated with
increased activity in the hippocampus at pre-treatment baseline
tests when participants are processing CS–US relationships
and in particular when appraising the CS as threatening and
predictive of the US (Lueken et al., 2013). Increased volume
and activation of the hippocampus has also been associated
with an attention bias toward threat faces in a Dot Probe task
(Fani et al., 2013). More speciﬁcally, deﬁcits in disengagement
from threat have been associated with sustained activity in
the hippocampus even after attention has been directed away
from threat and toward a neutral stimulus (Price et al., 2014).
Research suggests that the hippocampus is part of a network
of brain regions, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex
and the amygdala, that are responsible for fear acquisition
and extinction. In particular, the hippocampus seems to be
involved in discriminating new information from information
that has previously been learnt (Milad and Quirk, 2012).
Increased hippocampal activity and maintenance of attention
toward a threat may be associated with increased eﬀorts to
retrieve previous learning concerning the CS–US contingency
and integrate this with current information about the CS.
This new learning in the hippocampus could then be fed into
other regions of the network in provoking fear excitation or
inhibition depending on whether or not the potential threat that
was attended to resulted in the aversive consequence that was
anticipated.
Research from pharmaceutical augmentation studies can also
shed further light on the possible role of attentional biases in
treatment where the pharmaceuticals in question are known to
inﬂuence the neural attention system. The eye region of the
face represents a particularly salient signal for threat for people
with SAD. Overt gaze ﬁxation to this region of the face is
associated with heightened physiological and amygdala activity
(e.g., Schneier et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009). The amygdala
is thought to play an important role in the expression of fear
such that heightened activity in this region has been associated
with the anticipation and experience of an aversive event (Milad
and Quirk, 2012). Intranasal administration of oxytocin has been
associated with increased frequency and duration of ﬁxations on
the eye region of the face during free-viewing in a gaze-tracking
procedure (Guastella et al., 2008). This might be because oxytocin
can reduce activity in the amygdala in response to threat-related
faces (Labuschagne et al., 2010). Oxytocin administration has also
been associated with enhanced response to exposure therapy in
SAD with greater improvement on self-report symptom scores
(Guastella et al., 2009). Under the inﬂuence of oxytocin, amygdala
activity and so too the physiological fear response may be reduced
and so socially anxious people are better able to spend more time
attending to the eye region of the face. Thismight in turn facilitate
violation of expectancy of negative social judgment and then also
lead to clinical improvement.
Genetic Correlates of Treatment Response
Lester and Eley (2013) present a review of genetic moderators
of treatment response for anxiety disorders. Within this review,
there are several particularly relevant examples. First, the short
allele, low-expression, polymorphism in the gene that codes
for the protein that transports serotonin from one neuron
to another (5-HTTLPR) has been associated with improved
response to treatment (e.g., Eley et al., 2012). This particular
polymorphism is associated with increased serotonin in the
cleft between neurons and this has been associated with
increased reactivity to stress and increased attention bias for
emotional stimuli (Pergamin-Hight et al., 2012). In particular,
the low expression polymorphism and greater availability of
serotonin in the synaptic cleft has been associated with increased
attention toward threat in an angry-face Dot Probe task (Pérez-
Edgar et al., 2010; Lonsdorf et al., 2014). The low-expression
polymorphism has also been associated with a stronger attention
bias toward threat after an attention bias modiﬁcation treatment
(ABMT) procedure designed to train attention toward threat,
relative to the high-expression form (Fox et al., 2011). People
with the low-expression form may be more likely to show
an attention bias toward threat and therefore also improved
response treatment.
Summary of Findings
There is some conﬂict in the literature concerning attention
biases and treatment outcome (see Table 1 for a summary).
There are a number of studies which illustrate how a tendency
to selectively attend toward threat is predictive of improved
response to exposure treatment relative to attending away from
threat (Price et al., 2011; Waters et al., 2012) and relative to
not having any particular bias (Lundh and Öst, 2001; Legerstee
et al., 2010; Niles et al., 2013). These data receive additional
support from neurological and genetic research that suggest
that patterns of neural activation and chemical transmission
associated with enhanced attentional engagement and deﬁcits
in attentional disengagement from threat are associated with
greater beneﬁt from treatment (Guastella et al., 2009; Eley
et al., 2012; Lueken et al., 2013). Conversely, there is also
some evidence to suggest that a tendency to avoid threat is
associated with improved response to treatment relative to
attending toward threat (Legerstee et al., 2009) or having no
bias in either direction (Legerstee et al., 2010). These data
gain partial support from self-report data from the domain of
coping styles wherein people who report a tendency to blunt
emotional information and avoid attending to threat show better
responding to treatment relative to people who monitor and
engage with threat (Muris et al., 1993a,b, 1995; Antony et al.,
2001).
Several earlier studies, prior to the development of more
robust measures of attentional selectivity such as the Dot Probe
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TABLE 1 | A summary of research exploring the relationship between pre-treatment attentional bias and treatment outcomes following CBT for a range
of anxiety disorders.
Sample Measures Treatment Main findings
Attention Outcomes Conditions No. sessions
Lavy et al.
(1993)
Adults; SP
(Spiders); N = 36
Stroop Behavioral approach test
(BAT)
Exposure with or
without elaboration
1 Worse outcomes for
people with SI
Mattia et al.
(1993)
Adults; SAD;
N = 33
Stroop Clinician severity rating
(CSR)
Drug vs. CBT vs.
placebo
12 No significant effects
van den Hout
et al. (1997)
Adults; SP
(Spiders); N = 37
Stroop Symptom scale (SPQ);
BAT
Exposure alone 1 No significant effects
Lundh and Öst
(2001)
Adults; SAD;
N = 24
Stroop Diagnostic interview
(ADIS)
Individual, group or
self-administered CBT
12 or
3 months
with
manual
Treatment responders
more likely to show SI
Devineni et al.
(2004)
Adults; PTSD;
N = 23
Stroop Symptom scale (CAPS) CBT vs. group support
vs. wait-list
8–12 No significant effects
Legerstee et al.
(2009)
Children; mixed;
N = 131
Dot
Probe
Diagnostic interview
(ADIS-C)
Individual (69%) or
group (31%) CBT
Not given Treatment responders
attend away from threat
Legerstee et al.
(2010)
Children; mixed
N = 91
Dot
Probe
Diagnostic interview
(ADIS-C)
Phase 1: individual CBT
Phase 2: parent–child
CBT for phase 1
non-responders
10 in phase
1;
4 in phase
2
Initial responders
attend away;
secondary responders
attend toward;
non-responders, no
bias
Price et al.
(2011)
Adults; SAD;
N = 24
Dot
Probe
Self-report symptom
scale (LSAS)
CBT with virtual
exposure
8 Symptom reduction
associated with
attention toward threat
Waters et al.
(2012)
Children;
GAD/SAD; N = 35
Dot
Probe
Self-report symptom
scale (SCAS-P); ADIS-C
Group CBT 10 Symptom reduction
associated with
attention toward threat
Niles et al.
(2013)
Adults; SAD;
N = 22
Spatial
cuing
Clinician rated fear and
avoidance; LSAS, SIAS,
and SPS composite
CBT vs. ACT 12 Symptom reduction
associated with
attention toward threat
(deficit in
disengagement)
SAD, social anxiety disorder; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; GAD, generalized anxiety disorder; CBT, cognitive-behavioral therapy; ACT, acceptance and
commitment therapy; SPQ, spider phobia questionnaire; ADIS (-C), Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule (-Child version); CAPS, Clinician Administered PTSD Scale;
LSAS, Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; SCAS-P, Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale – Parent Version; SIAS, Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS, Social Phobia Scale.
task or the Spatial Cuing task, showed that interference in the
Stroop task – and presumably therefore also attention toward
threat – was either not associated with treatment outcome (Mattia
et al., 1993; van denHout et al., 1997; Devineni et al., 2004) or was
associated with worsened outcome relative to people who showed
no interference/bias (Lavy et al., 1993).
Based on the most recent data, the majority of the literature
using more valid measures of attentional biases such as the Dot
Probe and Spatial Cuing task, seems to suggest that an attention
bias toward or away from threat is associated with improved
outcome relative to no bias at all. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that even when these two biases lead to the same
treatment response, they may diﬀer in terms of how rapidly they
lead to this response (Legerstee et al., 2010).
Discussion
Cognitive-behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders is imperfect;
relapse can occur. We present one possible cognitive variable
in attentional biases that might explain individual diﬀerences
in the learning that takes place during a crucial component of
CBT for anxiety disorder, exposure to feared stimuli, and in so
doing might also explain diﬀerences in treatment response. The
evidence presented in this review suggests that a tendency to
preferentially attend toward or away from threat, relative to an
equal distribution of attention irrespective of threat, results in
greater reduction in clinical symptoms and diagnoses following
CBT for children and adults with a range of anxiety disorders.
The idea that a neurocognitive factor such as an attention bias
that is also associated with the development and maintenance of
disorder, is similar to the ﬁndings of a recent review of genetic
predictors of treatment response wherein the same genes that are
associated with greater risk for anxiety are also associated with
the greatest improvement following psychotherapy (Lester and
Eley, 2013). One of the reasons that attention might inﬂuence
treatment outcome is through the role that attention plays in
the exposure component of CBT. It is possible, although not
directly tested in any of the reviewed studies, that a threat-related
attention bias alters processing of feared stimuli, the contexts
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that surround them and their relationships with expected aversive
events. In exposure it is essential that clients learn that the
things they are afraid of are not necessarily as bad as they
expect rather than to learn that they might not be bad because
they are in a safe environment or because the thing they
are encountering is not the same as the thing to which they
originally acquired fear or to other similar things they might
encounter after treatment. As such, biases in attentional selection
might facilitate greater engagement with threat and increase the
possibility that a person might learn that feared stimuli or their
fear-evoking features are not necessarily predictive of something
aversive occurring. Engagement with threat stimuli and their
threat-associated features might also narrow attention and reduce
engagementwith safe or non-threatening elements of a context or
a stimulus’ features that might predict the non-occurrence of the
US. Interestingly, this does not appear to be universally beneﬁcial,
as Price et al. (2011) reported that though attention toward threat
appears to be beneﬁcial, a particularly severe bias toward threat
was associated with worse outcomes.
It is important to reconcile the apparent conﬂict between data
that suggest that both an attention bias toward threat and away
from threat can both be beneﬁcial to a client. There is evidence
from Dot Probe and eye-tracking studies that even where an
attention bias away from threat might appear to be present,
that this bias is actually characterized by rapid orientation or
engagement with threat and then subsequent disengagement and
avoidance of threat (Koster et al., 2006; Armstrong and Olatunji,
2012). In a Dot Probe task with 500 ms cue presentations, as
is the case in all of the reviewed studies that use that measure,
participants are able to rapidly engage with the threat stimulus
and then rapidly shift their attention to the opposite neutral
stimulus and so respond to any target that follows this neutral
stimulus as though they had avoided the threat entirely (Hallion
and Ruscio, 2011). A fMRI study showed that the neurological
correlates of engagement with threat and of CS–US appraisal
continue to show sustained activity even when attention is no
longer overtly directed toward threat (Price et al., 2014). Perhaps
even when there is overt orientation of the eyes away from threat,
covert attention toward threat can persist. In this respect the
distinction between persons who appear to have a bias toward
or away from threat may not be as clear-cut as reaction time
based measures often suggest. More advanced methodology such
as eye-tracking or neuroimaging are needed to more accurately
examine how these patterns of attention are related to exposure
learning.
Another way to reconcile the apparent conﬂict between
attention biases toward and away from threat both being
beneﬁcial to treatment relates to the literature concerning focused
versus distracted exposure. It may be the case that attending away
from threat allows people to continue to engagewith the exposure
session whilst preventing them from being overwhelmed with
fear, in the same way that distracted exposure can enhance
treatment beneﬁt (Parrish et al., 2008). Being overwhelmed could
prevent anxious people from engaging fully with processing
feared stimuli or even prevent them from learning anything.
There is also some variability between the reviewed studies
concerning whether they show any eﬀect of attention on
treatment outcome. Some of the earlier studies using the
emotional Stroop task to measure threat interference showed no
association between supposed attentional biases and treatment
outcome. However, more recent interpretations of Stroop
interference are that it reﬂects a general deﬁcit in processing of
threat rather than any component of attention biases (Weierich
et al., 2008). Furthermore, the absence of Stroop interference
does not necessarily disqualify someone from having an attention
bias as it may also be the case that they exhibit a threat-
avoidant attention bias and enhanced disengagement from threat
relative to more vigilant people. Also, in some of these studies
participants were aggregated across treatment conditions into
overall treatment response groups (e.g., Mattia et al., 1993; Lundh
andÖst, 2001). As such, caution should be applied to any research
where Stroop interference is used to measure threat-related
attention biases. More sensitive measures of overt attention such
as the Dot Probe and Spatial Cuing tasks revealed signiﬁcant
associations between attention and treatment outcome.
Some of the data presented herein suggests that having no
predominant bias toward or away from threat is predictive of
worse treatment outcomes relative to the presence of attentional
biases in either direction. Despite a consensus within the
attention bias modiﬁcation literature that attention biases must
be reduced in the same way that other symptoms are (Hakamata
et al., 2010; Hallion and Ruscio, 2011; Beard et al., 2012),
the research presented here suggests that attentional biases can
actually facilitate clinical improvement. It may even be the case
that threat-related attention biases are a necessary component of
CBT for anxiety disorders given that some studies showed that
having no bias at all leads to no response to treatment.
If it is possible to improve treatment outcome by attending
more or less toward threat then it may be the case that
procedures that modify attentional biases could be used to
augment clinical improvement through exposure. Several studies
have been conducted to investigate the possible augmenting
eﬀects of ABMT on CBT. Studies have shown that training
attention away from threat (e.g., higher proportion of Dot Probe
cues following neutral stimuli) can improve treatment response
relative to CBT alone (Schechner et al., 2014) and CBT with a
placebo ABMT (Riemann et al., 2013; Kuckertz et al., 2014). Amir
and Taylor (2012) found that reductions in the bias toward threat
from pre- to post- treatment, following ABMT training attention
away from threat, was predictive of symptom improvement.
Kuckertz et al. (2014) showed that a threat-avoidant bias at
pre-treatment led to greatest clinical improvement after their
ABMT/CBT augmentative program relative to people with a bias
toward threat. However, Rapee et al. (2013) found no eﬀect of
their ABMT on clinical outcomes, although they also observed
no change in the bias from pre to post-treatment. Two studies
combining training attention toward positive stimuli (e.g., higher
proportion of Dot Probe cues following happy faces) with one
session exposure (Waters et al., 2014) or a larger CBT program
(Britton et al., 2013) found no signiﬁcant eﬀects on clinical
outcomes beyond CBT alone.
However, in these studies the ABMT is administered
concurrently with each CBT session making it impossible to
conclude as to the eﬀects of ABMT and changes in attention on
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subsequent learning during treatment. Also, the authors did not
include an additional comparison group wherein attention was
trained toward threat, although it was not within the purpose of
their studies to include such a control. This would allow us to
conclude as to whether attentional training in either direction
leads to better treatment response relative to placebo-ABMT or
no ABMT, or whether a bias in a particular direction leads to
better response. Nevertheless, there is some promising evidence
that augmenting CBT with ABMT might lead to improved
outcomes and in particular that training people to attend away
from threat might be most beneﬁcial. Future research must now
explore how changes in attention biases, as a result of ABMT,
might inﬂuence the way people learn during other aspects of CBT
such as during exposures.
An interesting adjunct to this is that some of the studies
reviewed here suggest that not all anxious people possess a
threat-related attention bias and if they do it may not be in the
same direction. Unaccounted for variability in the direction and
extent of pre-existing individual diﬀerences in attentional biases
in participants of ABMT trials might explain why ABMT shows
such small eﬀect sizes as it may be more diﬃcult to train people’s
attention in the opposite direction to their existing biases and
where there is already an attention bias away from threat it might
be more diﬃcult to inﬂuence anxiety symptoms by reinforcing
this bias (Hallion and Ruscio, 2011). It is most often the case
that in ABMT trials participants are distributed into treatment
groups irrespective of whether any attention bias exists or not and
irrespective of the direction of that bias should it exist (e.g., Amir
et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009). The data reviewed here suggests
that ABMT research should give greater consideration to pre-
existing biases prior to treatment as well as the interacting role
that attention biases might play in other elements of CBT. ABMT
in conjunction with CBT may not be necessary for people with
an attention bias toward threat as they may show a good response
to treatment without it. ABMT oﬀered prior to CBT might help
train people with no bias to engage more toward threat.
Although it is beyond the scope of the present review to
consider how similar processes might operate within other
treatments for anxiety, it is worth mentioning that similar
processes might operate in treatments such as acceptance and
commitment therapy (ACT). In ACT exposure to the sources
of one’s fears and reductions in avoidance of fear-evoking
stimuli are crucial. Niles et al. (2013) found that pre-treatment
attention biases were a better predictor of treatment outcome
for participants who underwent CBT than for participants who
underwent ACT. They hypothesize that ACT may speciﬁcally
target and modify attentional processes and so the eﬀects
of individuals diﬀerences on treatment outcome are reduced.
This suggests that individual diﬀerences in attention may
only inﬂuence outcomes in CBT because there is insuﬃcient
modiﬁcation of attention in existing CBT packages. ACT-based
research also suggests that high levels of trait avoidance, similar
to the attention-like trait of blunting, is predictive of lower
engagement with the exposure components of treatment (Levitt
et al., 2004). Future research could examine the beneﬁt to CBT of
incorporating some element of the attentional training that exists
in approaches such as ACT.
Clinical Implications
The evidence reviewed here has several implications for clinical
practice. We present one example of how individual diﬀerence
variables can inﬂuence treatment outcomes. This has rather
broad implications for clinical practice in suggesting that greater
care should be taken in tailoring treatment to individual
neurocognitive proﬁles rather than to try and ﬁt everyone
into the same treatment. More speciﬁcally, similar to Parrish
et al. (2008) who showed in their review of the eﬀects of
distraction on exposure outcome, we have shown that there
is a range of evidence suggesting that threat-related biases in
attention are not necessarily as negative as has been suggested
elsewhere and there should be less clinical emphasis placed
on resolving these biases where they exist. As was suggested
by Legerstee et al. (2010) it may even be necessary to train
attentional biases toward or away from threat in order to
produce the best response to treatment. Nevertheless, clinicians
may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to measure attention biases prior to
treatment in order to gear treatment to individual cognitive
proﬁles. In the presence of no attention bias or an attention
bias away from threat, it might be beneﬁcial for clinicians
to ensure that clients are focused on the exposure stimuli
and not the context of exposure, as well as the threatening
features of exposure stimuli and its commonalities with other
similar stimuli. In the case of attention toward threat it would
be important to ensure that clients aren’t overwhelmed by
their anxiety, and in particular cases of SAD and PD, it
would be important to make sure that clients do not focus
too much on internal symptoms but also acknowledge that
the anticipated negative outcome is not occurring. However,
some important issues must be examined further before
more meaningful conclusions and recommendations can be
given.
Future Research
One important omission in the existing literature concerns
whether any of the observed eﬀects of attention on treatment
outcome are preserved at follow-up assessments. This is
particularly important because it has often been shown that
people who respond best to treatment also often continue to
show selective attention toward threat after treatment (Legerstee
et al., 2009, 2010). Existing data concerning the potential
causative role of attentional biases in the development and
maintenance of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Van Bockstaele
et al., 2014) might suggest that those people who continue
to show a bias at post-treatment would also be the most
likely to relapse. For example, threat-related attentional biases
have been shown to be predictive of increased reactivity to
social stressors (Fox et al., 2010) and stimuli related to speciﬁc
phobias (Van Bockstaele et al., 2011). Prospective research
has also shown that children who show an attentional bias
toward threat are more likely to develop social withdrawal
typical of SAD in adolescence (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2011). If
attention biases develop or are reinforced by exposure treatment,
this could be a mechanism by which relapse occurs, even if
treatment is seen to be eﬀective immediately after treatment
completion.
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However, preferentially attending to previously feared stimuli
instead of neutral stimuli may not be maladaptive providing that
once a stimulus is attended to, there is not an overestimation that
something negative might subsequently occur. Unless increased
attention toward threat was also associated with anticipation of
an aversive event, then we might not expect any return of fear
to occur. As Legerstee et al. (2009) suggest, exposure therapy
might encourage people to attend toward supposedly threatening
stimuli but that is not to say that it encourages people to
anticipate threat after encountering a once feared stimulus. It may
also be the case that the attentional system operates similarly to
the valence system in so far as it is possible to show extinction
of fear and new learning about the contingency between a CS
and an aversive US but that is not to say that once feared
stimuli will show any change in pleasantness after extinction or
exposure (Hermans et al., 2002; Dirikx et al., 2004) just as people
may still show some preferential attentional tendency around
them.
The research to date also lacks an analysis of any possible
interactive eﬀects of attentional biases with diagnosis on
treatment outcome. Most studies include a broad range of
anxiety disorders and lack the sample size to investigate whether
the eﬀects of attentional biases on treatment outcome are
speciﬁc to a given anxiety diagnosis or whether the eﬀects
are transdiagnostic. There is evidence to suggest that there
is some speciﬁcity in the direction and latency of attentional
biases between anxiety disorders (Armstrong and Olatunji, 2012)
and so we might also expect diﬀerential eﬀects on treatment.
Additionally, most of the studies reviewed here include exposure
within an overarching CBT program. It is important that further
research clariﬁes whether the eﬀects of attentional biases on
treatment outcome are speciﬁc to exposure and extinction
learning or are due to an interaction between attention and
some other element of CBT. What is also lacking in many
of the studies reviewed here is a sample of participants who
exhibited no attention bias in any particular direction. This
third group can act as a vital comparison in determining
whether any bias is better than no bias in terms of positively
inﬂuencing treatment outcome. Future research could also
assess the potential relationship between trait-based individual
diﬀerences in the scope of attention (narrow or broad), perhaps
using the Navon task (see Navon, 1977), and the direction of
attention biases in predicting treatment outcome. It may be
the case that among those who preferentially attend toward
threat, only those who also show a tendency for narrowed
attentional focus would show improved response to treatment
relative to those with a broader focus of attention. This is
because the broad group may be more likely to also process
contextual cues that might explain the non-occurrence of the
US, whereas the narrow group may only attend to the threat
stimulus. Where possible Dot Probe and Spatial Cuing tasks
should also use disorder-congruent and perhaps also individually
selected stimuli so as to provide the most accurate picture of
the extent of individual attention biases (Pergamin-Hight et al.,
2015). Much of this work can also be achieved experimentally,
similarly to the study performed by Waters and Kershaw
(2015) where fear is installed and extinguished in a laboratory
setting, and the eﬀects of individual diﬀerences in attention are
explored.
Nevertheless, research must now directly examine, through
experimental and clinical investigation, why individual
diﬀerences in attentional biases can inﬂuence treatment
outcome. There must be a move away from reaction time
measures to more robust measurement techniques that allow for
direct, online, measurement of overt and covert attention before
and during exposures. Eye-tracking methodology could provide
such a measure of overt attention and neuroimaging might be
used to assess covert attention. Pre-treatment ﬁxation data could
be used to predict subsequent treatment response in the same
way that Dot Probe data has to-date. This could be coupled with
neuroimaging data to assess whether the relationship between
overt attention toward or away from threat and treatment
outcome is in turn related to neural patterns of covert threat
engagement. We might also measure ﬁxation and neural activity
during exposures. From this it would be possible to relate pre-
treatment attention biases to actual visual behavior and covert
engagement during exposure and to relate these variables to fear
within- and between- sessions as well as overall clinical response
at post-treatment and follow-up. This would make it possible to
test whether people with an attention bias show better treatment
response than people with no attention bias because they spend
more time processing exposure stimuli rather than to distractors
in the environment, contexts or safe stimulus features.
Conclusion
In order to further improve already eﬃcacious treatments, it is
important that there is now a move within clinical psychology
from a broad perspective where treatment modalities compete
against one another for superiority, to one in which we consider
which treatments work best for whom and why. It is important
that we now consider how the individual diﬀerences that underlie
disorder interact with existing treatments in order to better
understand the mechanisms by which these treatments work.
This knowledge can be used to not only guide the prescription of
treatment but also to enhance some element of treatment. More
speciﬁcally, it is also important that there is a move away from
considering biases in attention – and no doubt cognitive biases in
general – as universally negative, and a move toward considering
them from a functional perspective where they can be positive in
certain situations where enhanced threat processing and reduced
peripheral processing is required.
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